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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the determinants of the differential pricing of equity classes (the so-called dual-class 
premium [DCP]) in Brazil from 1995 to 2006 with a focus on two specific corporate governance aspects: i) the 
granting of tag along rights, a mandatory bid rule that extends to minority shareholders the right to sell their 
shares in case of a control transfer; and ii) the identity of the controlling shareholders, with an emphasis on 
family control. We examined 87 Brazilian listed firms throughout the period, resulting in a sample of 3,287 
observations. We found empirical evidence that changes in Corporate Law decreased (increased) the advantage 
of voting shares in terms of tag along rights reduced (incremented) DCP. However, we did not find empirical 
evidence that the voluntary granting of tag along rights altered DCP. We also found evidence suggesting that 
family control is positively associated with DCP level. Overall, our results indicate that regulations regarding 
shareholders’ rights and the identity of controlling shareholders are the two relevant corporate governance 
variables for DCP level in environments characterized by concentrated ownership structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Two different equity classes of a single firm with the same cash-flow rights but different voting 
rights should lead to equal pricing(1). However, a series of theoretical and empirical studies have 
shown that a price premium (the so called voting premium or VP) could exist for voting shares over 
non-voting shares of a single firm(2). These empirical results are explained by two main arguments: 1) 
that controlling shareholders can extract private benefits of control (which would lead to a positive 
relation between the amount of these private benefits and VP); and 2) that voting shares could be 
important in a takeover contest, seizing a fraction of the premium to be paid by eventual acquirers(3) 
(which would lead to a positive relationship between the probability of voting shares being important 
for acquirers and VP). Caprio and Croci (2008, p. 5) summarize this discussion, arguing that well-
established literature suggests that the main determinants of the price differential between voting and 
non-voting shares are the presence of private benefits of control and the probability that the incumbent 
will be dispossessed of control by someone who accumulates a larger voting block. 
In the case of firms with dispersed ownership such as large Anglo-Saxon companies, competition for 
control can be intense, and marginal shareholders are crucial in control contests. On the other hand, for 
firms with concentrated ownership, such as all Brazilian firms analyzed in this paper, marginal voting 
shareholders do not play any pivotal role in control contests since controlling shareholders always 
have a majority of outstanding voting shares(4). As a consequence, the differential pricing between 
voting and non-voting shares would be solely due to the probability of extraction of private benefits of 
control and to the difference of some observable rights attached to different equity classes (such as 
different dividends, mandatory bid rule, liquidity differentials, etc.).  
Corroborating the hypothesis that the relative value of voting shares against non-voting shares can 
be seen as a proxy for the level of private benefits extracted by controlling shareholders, several 
previous researches have found lower VP for firms located in countries with stronger investor 
protection. Specifically, for countries considered to have stronger investor protection, VP ranged 
between 0-20%(5), whereas for countries considered to have weaker investor protection VP ranged 
between 50-100%(6). The negative relationship between the quality of investor protection and the level 
of voting premium was further confirmed by Nenova (2003) after analyzing data of 661 companies 
from 18 countries. Doidge (2004) also corroborated the above hypothesis, finding that VP is lower for 
firms that cross-listed their shares in markets with higher corporate governance standards, therefore 
committing themselves to reducing the level of private benefits to be extracted by their controlling 
shareholders. 
In Brazil, contrary to most equity markets, voting shares are reported to have been traded at a 
discount relative to non-voting shares (Silva & Subrahmanyam, 2007)(7). There are four main reasons 
for this result: i) both papers only analyze voting shares available for trading in the market, therefore 
not taking into account the implicit voting premium held by the shares of controlling shareholders; ii) 
non-voting shares usually have higher liquidity levels than voting shares; and iii) for most firms, the 
dividend paid for non-voting shares is 10% higher than for voting shares. As a result, we cannot 
consider the price differential between voting and non-voting shares floating in the market in Brazil as 
an accurate measure of the voting premium. Rather, it simply corresponds to a dual class premium 
[DCP] between two share classes, which will be the term we will use henceforth.  
In recent years, Brazilian firms have seen important changes in the relative rights of voting shares 
against non-voting shares, which could have impacted DCP. These changes are related to the concept 
of mandatory bid rule, in which minority shareholders have the right to receive at least a given 
percentage of the price paid by controlling shareholders in case of selling their control stake. The 
mandatory bid rule is known in Brazil as the tag along right which will be the term that we will use 
henceforth.  
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On the one hand, firms have seen changes in corporate law that can be considered exogenous events. 
Prior to May 1997, the acquirer of a control block was required to make an offer to the remaining 
voting shareholders at the same price offered to controlling shareholders. Therefore, under the original 
corporate law (Law n. 6.404, 1976), a tag along right of 100% for minority voting shareholders was in 
place. However, Law 9.457, enacted in May 1997, amended the previous corporate law, abolishing tag 
along rights(8). Finally, a new amendment to corporate law, Law 10.303, enacted in October 2001, 
partially reinstated tag along rights for minority voting shareholders, this time with 80% of the price 
paid for the shares of the controlling block. On the other hand, since 2001 some firms have voluntarily 
decided to grant tag along rights to minority shareholders (even non-voting shareholders) beyond law 
requirements in Brazil. This decision was taken as part of the process that some firms carried out to 
adopt the so-called best corporate governance practices(9). Therefore, we have also seen an 
endogenous decision leading to a different balance of rights between voting and non-voting shares 
throughout this period, which could have impacted DCP in Brazil. 
In sum, the Brazilian case is interesting for three reasons: i) the issuance of non-voting shares is 
widespread; ii) there is a large wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights held by controlling 
shareholders(10); and, iii) the country witnessed exogenous events (two changes in corporate law) as 
well as endogenous ones (voluntary granting of tag along rights by firms willing to improve their 
corporate governance practices) that changed the level of tag along rights throughout the research 
period (1995 to 2006). Besides the exogenous and endogenous changes regarding mandatory bid rules, 
about half of Brazilian listed firms are controlled by families(11), which could possibly impact DCP. 
This hypothesis was recently tested by Caprio and Croci (2008) in Italy. The authors argue that the 
role of family control is an important factor in explaining DCP, ignored by previous literature(12).  
In short, we aim to answer two main questions, which constitute the main contributions of this 
paper: 1) How do exogenous and endogenous changes in a specific corporate governance device, 
called tag along rights, impact DCP over time in Brazil?; and, 2) Does the identity of the controlling 
shareholder matter for the level of DCP?  
Regarding the first question, our empirical results suggest that the enactment of corporate laws have 
a significant influence on DCP. Specifically, exogenous legal changes that increased (decreased) the 
relative advantage of voting shares vis-à-vis non-voting shares regarding tag along rights increased 
(decreased) DCP in Brazil. However, we did not find robust evidence that voluntary granting of tag 
along rights (an endogenous change promoted by firms) influences DCP level in our sample. 
Regarding the second question, we found a positive relation between family control and DCP. This 
result is in line with the results obtained regarding the Italian market by Caprio and Croci (2008).    
Besides the two main results, other results stand out: i) we observed a significant variation in DCP in 
Brazil during our sample period, ranging from a mean (median) of 17.97% (4.95%) in 1996 to -2.87% 
(-6.93%) in 2000; ii) liquidity and dividend differentials between voting and non-voting shares play a 
significant role in explaining DCP; and, iii) the concentration of both control rights and cash flow 
rights by controlling shareholders influences the DCP level.  
The paper is structured as follows: we initially present some background on the institutional 
framework in Brazil, including the main changes from 1995 to 2006, as well as results from recent 
papers on this field of research. We then proceed with the methodological detailing of the paper, 
including the research model and variable definitions. After the methodology section, we present and 
discuss the main empirical results, with the final section providing the concluding remarks.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN BRAZIL 
 
 
The main differences between voting and non-voting shares in Brazil are stated by Law 6.404/1976 
(Original Corporate Law). This Law had important amendments in May 1997 by Law 9.457/1997 and 
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in October 2001 by Law 10.303/2001. This section provides some evidence on how the changes in 
corporate law altered the balance of rights between voting and non-voting shares in Brazil from 1995 
to 2006.  
 
Prior to May 1997 
 
Law 6.404/1976, enacted in December 1976, governed Brazilian corporations without changes until 
1997. The Law allowed firms to issue common (voting) shares and preferred (non-voting) shares. 
Non-voting shares could constitute up to two thirds of total outstanding shares, meaning that 
controlling shareholders could directly own only 16.7% of the total share capital in order to assure 
control. Article 254 of the Law required a mandatory offer for all outstanding voting shares in case of 
a control transfer at the same price and terms of the control block shares. The original Corporate Law 
also set a mandatory minimum dividend payment of 25% of net income. As an additional protection 
for non-voting shareholders, if the company fails to distribute dividends for three years in a row (e.g. 
due to losses), preferred non-voting shareholders acquire full voting rights until the firm starts 
repaying dividends. 
 
May 1997 Amendments to the Corporate Law 
 
To avoid likely lawsuits from minority shareholders during the privatization process, Brazilian 
Congress approved amendments to the Corporate Law – known as Law 9.457/1997 – in May 1997. 
This new legal framework repealed Article 254, making it no longer necessary that the acquirer had to 
make a public offer to buy all outstanding voting shares under the same terms as those offered to 
previous controlling shareholders. To mitigate the impact on minority shareholders, the new regulation 
entitled preferred non-voting shareholders to an additional 10% in dividends compared to those paid to 
ordinary voting shareholders(13). 
 
October 2001 Amendments to the Corporate Law 
 
Law 10.303/2001, enacted in October 2001, was designed to minimize the negative impacts of the 
previous legislation (Law n. 9.457, 1997). Among other new clauses, it partially reinstated tag along 
rights for voting shares, assuring minority voting shareholders an offer of at least 80% of the price 
paid for control block shares. Furthermore, Law 10.303/2001 reduced the maximum ratio of non-
voting shares from two-thirds to one-half of total capital(14), and allowed firms to choose among three 
different benefits to be granted to non-voting shares as a compensation for the absence of voting 
rights: (a) a priority minimum dividend of 3% of the book value per share, (b) dividends 10% higher 
than voting shares, (c) tag along rights similar to the voting shares (80% of the price paid for the 
controlling block). In spite of the three options available for non-voting shares, the vast majority of 
firms chose to maintain the differentiated dividends for non-voting shares as the extra-benefit for this 
class of stock. Finally, it is important to note that non-voting shares have never been required by 
Corporate Law to be under tag along rights in Brazil. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DETERMINANTS OF DUAL-CLASS SPREAD 
 
 
Several studies have attempted to evaluate the determinants of the dual class premium. Next, we 
present the results of papers we consider more compatible with our focus and methodology. Based on 
these works, we then present the hypothesis regarding the potential determinants tested in our paper. 
Nenova (2001) is the first paper to estimate the value of the control block in Brazil. She found that 
the control value for listed Brazilian companies was directly affected by changes in the legal 
protection for minority shareholders. Specifically, she observed that the control value increased more 
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than twice with the enactment of Law 9.457/1997 (which weakened minority investor protection). 
Two years later, control value dropped to pre-1997 levels in response to CVM Instruction 299/1999, 
which reinstated the minority protection laws scrapped by the previous legal change(15). The author 
also found evidence that majority shareholders shared some of the benefits they extracted with 
minority voting shareholders in detriment of minority non-voting shareholders. 
Damodaran (2005) created a model to estimate the fair value of voting shares vis-à-vis non-voting 
shares. According to this author, the difference in price between two share classes should be a function 
of the expected value of control. This, in turn, would be a function of the probability of a change in 
management at that firm and the value of changing management. Based on this model, the author 
made several testable predictions. For our paper, the most important ones are: i) The difference 
between voting and non-voting shares should go to zero if there is no chance of changing 
management/control. This will clearly be a function of the concentration of ownership of the voting 
shares. If there are relatively few voting shares, held entirely by insiders, voting shares should trade at 
the same price as non-voting shares. ii) Other things remaining equal, the smaller the number of voting 
shares relative to nonvoting shares, the higher the premium for voting shares. Since the expected value 
of control is divided by the number of voting shares to receive the premium, the smaller that number, 
the greater the value attached to each share.  
Caprio and Croci (2008) examined the dual class premium in Italy from 1974 to 2003, a period 
during which the premium fluctuated widely in the country, ranging from 1% to 100%. They found 
that family firms have higher DCP, especially when the family owns a large stake in the company’s 
voting equity. They explain this result based on two arguments: i) that families have a higher 
attachment to control (probably reacting more vigorously to potential threats of takeover by 
purchasing additional voting shares); and ii) that families are more prone than other types of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the non-voting class of shareholders.  
Linciano (2003) also analyzes the dual class premium in the Italian market, examining the effects of 
changes in the mandatory bid rule introduced there in 1992. This rule allowed minority voting 
shareholders to receive the same price per share in an acquisition paid by controlling shareholders. 
However, this right was not extended to non-voting shareholders. The author found an increase of 
around 2% in the premium on voting shares.  
Ødegaard (2006) analyzed the dual class premium in Norway. Differently from the majority of 
papers in this line of research. But in line with previous results found in the Brazilian market, he 
found, for part of the sample period, nonvoting trading at a premium to voting stock. According to the 
author, this was due some unique features of Norwegian corporate law that restricted the access of 
foreigners only to nonvoting stocks, pushing up the price of these shares. In short, he found evidence 
that the effects stemming from market segmentation and liquidity could sometimes outweigh the 
corporate governance effects.  
Nenova (2003) conducted a cross-country analysis of 661 companies from 18 countries. She 
developed a methodology to compute the voting premium associated with a controlling block of shares 
based on the difference between the market prices of different classes of shares. The voting premium 
ranged from -5% in Finland to 36.5% in Mexico across the countries. Overall, she found that countries 
with strong law enforcement, good investor protection indices and pro-investor takeover rules have 
lower voting premiums. 
Finally, Adams and Ferreira (2007) made a comprehensive survey of the empirical economic 
literature on disproportional ownership, including the dual class premium. The authors argued that 
there are two mains approaches to estimating the control block premium. The first one is to infer it 
from the difference between the market value of different classes of voting shares. The second 
approach is to infer the control premium from sales of controlling blocks (Dyck & Zingales, 2004, 
provide an example of application of the second approach).  
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In this paper, we measure DCP using the first approach, which has been the most popular in the 
literature. Therefore, the dual class premium is computed as follows: 
v nv
it it
it nv
it
P PDCP
P
−
=  
Equation 1 
 
where ( )v nvit itP P  is the price of voting (non-voting) share of company i in period t. 
Based on the research presented and on the rationale displayed in Table 1, we developed the 
following main testable hypotheses for our paper regarding the potential determinants of the dual class 
premium:   
Hypothesis 1: Law 9.457/1997, which excluded tag along rights for minority voting shareholders, 
had a negative impact on DCP. 
Hypothesis 2: Law 10.303/2001, which partially reinstated tag along rights only for minority voting 
shareholders, had a positive impact on DCP. 
Hypothesis 3: The voluntary granting of tag along rights for both voting and non-voting shares, or 
exclusively for non-voting shares, had a negative impact on DCP. 
Hypothesis 4: Family control is positively associated with DCP, since families have a higher 
attachment to control and are more prone than other types of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
non-voting shareholders (Caprio & Croci, 2008). 
Hypothesis 5: State-owned control is negatively associated with DCP since there is a lower 
probability of these firms being acquired.  
Besides the five main hypotheses related to the mandatory and voluntary granting of tag along 
rights, and the type of controlling shareholders, we also developed other hypotheses usually tested in 
the related DCP literature: 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the dividend differential in favor of non-voting shares, the lower the DCP; 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the liquidity for non-voting shares relative to voting shares, the lower the 
DCP; Hypothesis 8: The ratio of voting shares (control rights) held by controlling shareholders is 
negatively associated with DCP, due to the reduction of the probability of a takeover taking place 
(Damodaran, 2005), and  the negative impact on the liquidity of voting shares; Hypothesis 9: The 
ratio of total shares (cash flow rights) held by controlling shareholders is positively associated with 
DCP, since it will be associated with lower levels of private benefits of control; Hypothesis 10: For 
lower levels of financial leverage, the price differential between voting and non-voting stock should 
rise due to the potential extraction of larger private benefits of control. For higher levels of financial 
leverage, the relation should reverse due to an increasing risk of bankruptcy and then control change to 
debt claimants (Saito, 2003); Hypothesis 11: Firms’ size is negatively associated with DCP, since 
larger firms are less likely to experience control transfers.   
Table 1 summarizes all the potential DCP determinants tested, including the operational definition of 
the variables, rationale and expected sign of the coefficients.  
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Table 1 
 
Summary of Research Variables, Operational Definitions, and Rationale for Expected 
Coefficients’ Signs 
 
# Code Name of Variable Operational Definition Expected Sign Rationale 
1 DCP Dual class 
premium – 
weighted average 
of share price 
(weighted average of 
quarterly prices of ON 
shares*– weighted 
average of quarterly prices 
of  PN shares during the 
quarter) / weighted 
average of quarterly prices 
of  PN shares 
NA 
(dependent 
variable) 
NA 
2 LIQ_vol Liquidity difference 
between ON and PN 
share classes 
(financial volume) 
ln (quarterly financial 
volume of ON shares / 
quarterly financial 
volume of PN shares) 
+ Largest financial volumes 
of ON shares relative to PN 
shares will lead to a larger 
dual class premium. 
3 LIQ_neg Liquidity 
difference between 
ON and PN share 
classes (Bovespa 
liquidity index) 
ln (quarterly Bovespa 
liquidity index of  ON 
shares / quarterly 
Bovespa liquidity index 
of PN shares) 
+ Largest liquidity index of 
ON shares relative to PN 
shares will lead to a larger 
dual class premium. 
4 ON_conc Percentage of 
voting shares held 
by three largest 
shareholders** 
Sum of ON shares held 
by three largest 
shareholders divided by 
total ON shares issued 
- Higher concentration of voting 
shares will negatively impact 
the liquidity of ON shares and 
reduce the probability of a 
takeover taking place 
(Damodaran, 2005), thus 
negatively impacting dual 
class premium. 
5 TS_conc Percentage of total 
shares held by 
three largest 
shareholders 
Sum of total shares held 
by three largest 
shareholders divided by 
total shares issued 
- Higher percentage of total 
shares (cash flow rights) held 
by controlling shareholders 
will be associated with lower 
levels of private benefits of 
control, leading to a small 
dual class premium. 
6 RAT_ON Ratio of ON shares 
to the company’s 
total capital 
Number of ON shares 
divided by the total 
number of outstanding 
shares (ON and PN) 
ambiguous The use of non-voting shares 
in the firms’ capital enables 
the controlling shareholder to 
leverage resources with non-
voting shareholders. 
Therefore, this shareholding 
leverage implies larger 
private benefits of control, 
leading to higher dual class 
premiums. On the other 
hand, Damodaran (2005) 
argues that, since the 
expected value of control is 
divided by the number of 
voting shares to get the 
premium, the smaller that 
number, the greater the value 
attached to each share. 
Continues 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
# Code Name of Variable Operational Definition Expected Sign Rationale 
7 DIV_DIF Difference of 
dividends paid to 
voting (ON) and 
non-voting (PN) 
shares 
(Dividends paid to ON 
shares – Dividends paid 
to PN shares) / 
Dividends paid to PN 
shares 
+ A larger dividend differential 
favoring PN shares relative to 
dividends paid to ON shares 
will lead to a small dual class 
premium. 
8 DUM_
DIV 
Dummy indicating 
if ON shares 
received the same or 
superior dividends 
regarding PN shares 
DUM_DIV = 1 if ON 
shares quarterly dividends 
were larger or the same as 
the PN shares’ quarterly 
dividends; 0 for larger PN 
dividends 
+ An absence of a positive 
dividend differential 
favoring PN shares relative 
to ON shares will lead to a 
small dual class premiums 
9 lnTA Firm’s size – 
Natural logarithm 
of total assets 
ln (total assets) - Larger firms will have a 
low likelihood of control 
transfers, leading to a small 
dual class premium. 
10 Lever 
and 
Lever_ 
quad 
Financial leverage Long term financial 
liabilities / total assets 
+ linear, - 
quadratic 
Low levels of debt will 
positively influence dual 
class premium. However, 
higher levels of financial 
leverage could increase the 
likelihood of control transfers 
to creditors, diminishing the 
voting premium. 
11 Ind 
1...17 
Set of industry 
dummies 
Seventeen binary 
variables indicating the 
firm’s industry 
N.A. Industry can influence the 
probability of control 
transfers and M&A 
activity, influencing dual 
class premiums 
12 Law 
6404 
Dummy variable 
for Law 6404/76 
Law 6404 = 1 if the 
quarter of analysis is 
within first quarter 
1994 and first quarter 
1997, prior to Law 
9457 (when Article 254 
of Law 6404 was in 
force), 0 otherwise 
+ 
13 Law 
9457 
Dummy variable 
for Law 9457/97 
Law 9457 = 1 if the 
quarter of analysis is 
within second quarter 
1997 and third quarter 
2001, prior to Law 10303 
(when Article 254 was 
revoked), 0 otherwise 
- 
14 Law 
10303 
Dummy variable 
for Law 10303/01 
Law 10303 = 1 for 
quarter of analysis from 
fourth quarter 2001 on, 
(when Article 254 was 
reinstated), 0 otherwise 
+ 
With the passing of Law 
9457, the mandatory bid 
rule for ON shares 
prescribed in Article 254 
was revoked, negatively 
influencing dual class 
premium. With the 
approval of Law 10303, 
Article 254 was reinstated, 
prescribing an 80% 
mandatory bid rule for ON 
shares, therefore positively 
influencing dual class 
premium. 
Continues 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
# Code Name of Variable Operational Definition Expected Sign Rationale 
15 Tag_pn Additional tag 
along rights 
(mandatory bid 
rule) voluntarily 
granted only for 
PN shares 
Tag_pn = 1 if the firm 
voluntarily grants tag 
along rights only for 
PN shares, without any 
additional tag along for 
ON shares beyond what 
is required by Law 
(80%), 0 otherwise 
- The granting of tag along 
rights only for PN shares 
diminishes the relative 
advantage of ON shares, 
negatively influencing dual 
class premium 
16 Tag_on
pn 
Additional tag 
along rights 
voluntarily granted 
both for ON and 
PN shares 
Tag_onpn = 1 if the 
firm voluntarily grants 
tag along rights both for 
ON and PN shares, 0 
otherwise 
- The granting of tag along 
rights both for ON and PN 
also should negatively 
influence dual class 
premium, since the marginal 
gain for ON shares (which 
start from a Law prescribed 
tag along of 80%) would be 
substantially smaller than 
the marginal gain for PN 
shares 
17 Tag_Al
ong 
Any additional tag 
along rights 
voluntarily granted 
Tag_Along = 1 
Tag_onpn = 1 if the 
firm voluntarily grants 
any tag along rights 
beyond what is required 
by Law (sum of 
Tag_onpn and Tag_pn 
variables), 0 otherwise 
- The granting of tag along 
rights in any circumstance 
diminishes the relative 
advantage of ON shares, 
negatively influencing the 
dual class premium 
18 FAM Family Owned 
Firm 
FAM = 1 if a family (or 
a group of families 
formally united by a 
shareholders 
agreement) controls 
more than 50% of 
voting shares, 0 
otherwise 
+ Family control associated 
with a higher probability of 
extraction of private benefits 
of control (Caprio & Croci, 
2008). 
19 SOE State Owned 
Enterprise 
SOE = 1 if government 
controls more than 50% 
of voting shares, 0 
otherwise 
- State owned firms having a 
smaller probability of being 
acquired, leading to a small 
voting premium. 
Note. * The average quarterly price of each share class was calculated based on the rolling weighted average of closing share 
prices for a period of n traded days: WA = (P[t] * N + P[t-1] * (N-1) + P[t-2] * (N-2) + ... + P[t-N]) / N + (N-1) + (N-2) + ... 
+ (N - N).  Where: WA = weighted average, P[t] = share price at date t, P[t-1] = share price at date t – 1,  N = number of 
share traded days throughout the quarter.  The idea was to take into account the share price throughout the quarter, imputing 
more relevance to the last days of the period. ** We only analyzed the direct ownership structure for all ownership variables 
(ON_conc, PN_conc, and TS_conc). 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
The sample consists of 87 financial and non-financial firms listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange 
(Bovespa) with dual class shares from 1st quarter 1995 to 3rd quarter 2006. These firms are selected 
after exclusions based on: i) lack of a minimal level of liquidity of voting and non-voting shares; ii) 
negative book value of equity; and, iii) incomplete or unavailable market and/or accounting 
information. The data is computed by quarters(16), resulting in an unbalanced panel of 3,287 firm-
quarterly observations. All data was collected using the Economatica database(17). The variable 
representing DCP is winsorized at 2.5% level(18). 
 
Research Model  
 
Based on the potential determinants of DCP, we estimated the following model using Pooled OLS 
and Fixed Effects panel data regressions(19). Details of operational definitions of all variables presented 
below are presented in Table 1.  
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Equation 2 
Where: 
Dual Class Premium [DCP]; DIF_LIQ – liquidity differential between voting and nonvoting shares 
(proxied by LIQ_vol or LIQ_neg variables alternatively); DIF_DIV – dividend differential between 
voting and non-voting shares; ON_conc – controlling shareholder stake of voting shares; TS_conc – 
controlling shareholder stake of total shares; RAT_ON – ratio of voting shares to total shares 
outstanding; lnTA – firms’ size (proxied by Total Assets); LEVER – Financial leverage; LAW6404, 
LAW9457, and LAW 10303 – dummy variables associated with validity of tag along clauses enacted 
by laws 6.404/1976, 9.457/1997, and 10.303/2001, respectively; TAG_ALONG – dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the firm has voluntarily granted tag along rights; FAM – dummy variable that equals 1 
if the firm is family controlled; SOE – dummy variable that equals 1 if the Government is the 
controlling shareholder; IND – series of 17 industry dummies (according to Economatica® database 
classification). 
In Equation 2, i represents the firm and t the respective quarter (with 1,2,..., 48t = ). itε  is the random 
error term from the i-th firm in the t-th quarter. The term iu  captures unobserved firm characteristics 
that do not vary over time. Based on the hypothesis summarized in Table 1, we expect statistically 
significant coefficients with the following signs: β1, β2, β7, β9, β11, β13 >0; β3, β4, β6, β8, β10, β12, β14 <0; 
Since the direction of the relationship between the ratio of voting shares over total shares outstanding 
shares and DCP is ambiguous, we do not have an expected sign for the coefficient β5; δ are 
coefficients related to several binary industry control variables. 
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RESULTS 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Initially, we present in Table 2 some descriptive statistics with the evolution of DCP from 1995 to 
2006 in Brazil.  
 
Table 2 
 
Dual Class Premium from First Quarter 1995 to Last Quarter 2006 
 
 Dual class premium 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
# of 
Firms 
1995 15.00% 7.29% -47.50% 111.08% 33.88% 40 
1996 17.97% 4.95% -52.16% 180.32% 41.45% 44 
1997 10.81% 4.37% -50.37% 165.73% 35.54% 44 
1998 11.98% 2.13% -57.71% 262.66% 48.49% 53 
1999 -0.30% -6.78% -77.37% 224.59% 46.63% 65 
2000 -2.87% -6.93% -61.55% 200.89% 33.17% 74 
2001 9.04% 1.62% -54.63% 167.21% 31.67% 79 
2002 8.47% 0.30% -45.78% 122.11% 31.02% 82 
2003 5.13% -1.33% -45.49% 245.20% 33.20% 83 
2004 5.38% -2.32% -64.74% 181.91% 33.18% 85 
2005 9.11% 0.34% -44.45% 252.75% 38.05% 87 
2006 10.52% 1.07% -45.52% 239.48% 33.85% 87 
1995-2006 7.68% -0.06% -77.37% 262.66% 36.78%  
Note. The Dual Class Premium [DCP] is calculated as the difference of stock prices of ON shares to PN shares divided by 
the price of ON shares. The table below displays descriptive statistics of annual DCP results from 1st quarter 1995 to 4th 
quarter 2006, including the mean, median, minimum and maximum value found within the yearly sample, as well as the 
standard deviation. For each year, last column displays the number of firms evaluated (# of Firms).  
 
According to Table 2, average dual class premium [DCP] diminished in Brazil from 1995 to 2000, 
starting to increase again after that date. Overall, we found a mean positive DCP of 7.68% for the 
whole period, with a median close to zero. DCP results for 1995-2002 are in line with those obtained 
by Saito (2003). However, the overall sample period mean and median are significantly higher. This is 
due to the inclusion of 2003-2006 data, a period where we found a positive and larger DCP. In 
addition, the evolution of DCP can be graphically seen in Figure 1. 
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Evolution of Dual Class Premium in Brazil
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80% Tag Along Rights 
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Enactment of 
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 Law 6404/76 Law 9457/97 Law 10303/01 
Mean 16,4% 4,1% 8,0% 
Median 6,3% -2,1% -0,2% 
Standard Dev 38,6% 39,7% 34,1% 
N (observ) 377 1134 1775 
 
Test of differences between two-sample mean 
Ho: mean(Law 6404/76) – mean(9457/97) = diff = 0 
Ha: diff < 0 or Ha: diff > 0 
T = 5.2625 (P < t = 1.0000) 
P[diff mean(Law 6404/76) – mean(9457/97) < 0] = 1.0000 
 
Ho: mean(Law 9457/97) – mean(10303/01) = diff = 0 
Ha: diff < 0 or Ha: diff > 0 
T = 2.8152 (P < t = 0.9975) 
P[diff mean(Law 9457/97) – mean(10303/01) < 0] = 0.9975 
Figure 1: Evolution of Dual Class Premium in Brazil and Relation with Corporate Laws  
The figure presents the evolution of the Dual Class Premium [DCP] in Brazil from 1995 to 2006. DCP is calculated as the 
difference ON shares stock prices to PN shares divided by the price of ON shares. The Chart depicts the yearly mean and 
median results obtained for the sample. Below the Chart, is a Table comparing the mean and median DCP results in three 
different sub-periods: before the enactment of Law 6.404/76, between the enactment of Law 6.404/76 and Law 10.303/01, 
and after the enactment of Law 10.303/01. Subsequently, tests of differences between two-sample means are displayed in 
order to compare mean results for the abovementioned three sub-periods.  
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Figure 1 shows that the decrease and then increase of DCP in Brazil throughout the period can be 
reasonably proxied by a positive quadratic curve (trend lines on the chart for mean and median 
values). The chart also displays the two legal landmarks of the period: enactment of Laws 9.457/1997 
and 10.303/2001. As a result, we can visually analyze the three distinct legal sub-periods. The chart 
shows that mean and median DCP for the three sub-periods comprised by the three laws in force from 
1994 to 2006 are significantly different. Specifically, DCP is statistically larger during Law 
6.404/1976 (mean of 16.04% and median of 6.3%) than during Law 9.457/1997 (mean of 4.1% and 
median of -2.1%), and is larger during Law 10303/01 (mean of 8.0% and median of -0.2%) than 
during the previous Law 9.457/1997 period. Both results are consistent with the predictions based on 
tag along rights granted for voting shares (100% under Law 6.404/1976, 0% under Law 9.457/1997, 
and 80% and Law 10.303/2001), which changed the relative advantage of voting shares vis-à-vis non-
voting shares. Moreover, we also found a larger DCP during Law 6.404/1976 than during Law 
10.303/2001. This result can occur due to two reasons: i) the larger relative advantage of voting shares 
during Law 6.404/1976 than during Law 10.303/2001 (100% of tag along rights for ON shares in the 
former, against only 80% in the latter); or ii) the recent improvements in corporate governance quality 
in Brazil since 2000, resulting in smaller levels of private benefits of control and, consequently, in 
smaller DCP(20). 
Besides DCP evolution, we present descriptive statistics of selected explanatory variables in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Unit Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
# of 
Observ. 
Total Assets R$’000 13,030,081 1,958,992 11,783 245,925,353 33,271,004 3,254 
Revenues R$’000 2,672,049 627,572 86,41 140,896,903 8,118,432 2,730 
ON_conc % 56.0 52.3 7.7 100.0 24.9 3,286 
TS_conc % 52.1 49.1 7.7 100.0 24.4 3,284 
RAT_ON % 48.0 46.0 32.6 98.3 15.9 3,286 
Lever % 59.7 59.6 0.01 386.2 32.8 3,251 
LIQ_vol  -2.49 -2.43 -13.72 9.84 2.96 2,960 
LIQ_neg  -3.09 -2.73 -15.95 12.11 3.72 2,961 
DIV_DIF  -0.86 0 -1.00 0 0.21 3,285 
Note. The table provides descriptive statistics for relevant explanatory variables. Total assets and revenues are alternative 
measures of a firm’s size, indicating total balance sheet assets and operational revenues, respectively. ON_conc and  TS_conc 
are the percentage of voting (ON) and total shares held by three largest shareholders. RAT_ON is the ratio of voting shares to 
the company’s total outstanding shares. Lever is a measure of financial leverage of the companies. LIQ_vol and LIQ_neg are 
measures of the liquidity difference between ON and PN share classes, and DIV_DIF is a measure of the difference on 
dividends paid by voting (ON) shares against non-voting (PN) shares. A detailed description of all variables, including their 
operational definition, is presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 3 shows four important characteristics of Brazilian corporate governance: i) a high degree of 
ownership concentration (overall mean of 56% of voting shares directly held by controlling 
shareholders); ii) a low ratio of voting shares to total outstanding shares (mean of 48% of total capital 
issued in the form of voting shares); iii) a larger share liquidity for non-voting shares; and, iv) larger 
dividends paid to non-voting shares against voting shares.  
In order to initially analyze the association between DCP and the main explanatory variables, Table 
4 presents a matrix correlation of selected variables. 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Matrix between DCP and Selected Explanatory Variables  
 
 DCP LIQ_
vol 
DIV_
DIF 
DUM
_DIV 
InTA ON_ 
conc 
TS_ 
conc 
Taq_ 
onpn 
Law  
6404 
Law 
 9457 
Law 
10303 
DCP 1,00           
  
          
LIQ_vol 0.1030 1,00          
 
0.0000           
DIV_DIF -0.0433 -0.0101 1,00         
 
0.0206 0.5812          
DUM_DIV 0.0150 0.0128 0.2196 1,00        
 
0.4222 0.4850 0.0000         
InTA -0.0979 -0.0243 -0.1319 -01008 1,00       
 0.0000 0.1888 0.0000 0.0000        
ON_conc -0.0672 0.2407 -0.0035 0.0975 0.0322 1,00      
 0.0003 0.0000 0.8405 0.0000 0.0662       
TS_conc -0.0620 0.3040 -0.0256 0.0777 -0.0025 0.9032 1,00     
 0.0009 0.0000 01430 0.0000 0.8848 0.0000      
Taq_onpn -0.0934 -0.2264 0.0302 -0.0079 0.1550 -01331 -0.1046 1,00    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0831 0.6495 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
Law 
6404 0.1024 0.0104 0.0593 0.0947 0.0679 0.1764 -0.1019 -0.0686 1,00   
 0.0000 05716 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001    
Law 
9457 -0.0845 0.0165 -0.0376 -0.0078 0.0364 -0.0476 -0.0436 -0.1382 -02613 1,00  
 0.0000 0.3686 0.0311 0.6553 0.0380 0.0064 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000   
Law 
10303 0.0130 -0.0225 -0.0021 -0.0531 -0.0777 -0.0674 0.1086 0.1757 -0.3902 -0.7868 1,00 
 
0.4870 0.2211 0.9054 0.0023 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Note. The table displays the correlation matrix between the main variables of the study. DCP is the Dual Class Premium, 
calculated as the difference of stock prices of ON shares to PN shares divided by the price of ON shares. LIQ_vol and 
LIQ_neg are measures of the liquidity difference between ON and PN share classes. DIV_DIF is a measure of the difference 
on dividends paid by voting (ON) shares against non-voting (PN) shares. DUM_DIV is a dummy variable indicating if ON 
shares received the same or superior dividends regarding PN shares. lnTA is the natural logarithm of total accounting assets. 
ON_conc and TS_conc are the percentage of voting (ON) and total shares held by three largest shareholders. Tag_onpn. 
Tag_onpn is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm voluntarily grants tag along rights both for ON and PN shares. 
Law 6404, Law 9457, and Law 10303 are dummy variables assuming a value equal to 1 for the three different sub-periods 
under analysis (before the enactment of Law 6.404/76, between the enactment of Law 6.404/76 and Law 10.303/01, and after 
the enactment of Law 10.303/01), and zero otherwise. A detailed description of all variables, including their operational 
definition, is presented in Table 2.  
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 Table 4 shows statistically significant  (at 1% level) correlations of several explanatory variables 
with DCP in line with our hypothesis: i) the voluntarily granting of tag along rights negatively 
correlated with DCP; ii) Law 6.404/1976 and Law 9.457/1997 dummies positively and negatively 
related with DCP, respectively; iii) larger liquidity of voting shares vis-à-vis non-voting positively 
associated with larger DCP; iv) firm size negatively correlated with DCP; and, v) the concentration of 
voting rights and cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders negatively correlated with DCP. 
 
Determinants of Dual-class Share Premium  
 
In order to analyze the potential determinants of DCP in Brazil, we performed pooled OLS 
regressions and Fixed Effects [FE] procedures. The results from eight different model specifications 
performed with OLS and FE are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Determinants of Dual Class Premium [DCP] in Brazil – OLS Regressions 
 
 Dual class premium [DCP] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LIQ_vol 0.011*** (4.19)  
0.009*** 
(3.14) 
0.008*** 
(2.94) 
0.008*** 
(2.79) 
0.012*** 
(4.33) 
0.008*** 
(2.69) 
0.007** 
(2.41) 
LIQ_neg  0.004* (1.93)       
DIV_DIF 
0.001 
(0.25) 
  -0.014 
(-0.43) 
 -0.006 
(-0.20) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
 
DUM_DIV 
 -0.004 
(-0.29) 
-0.007 
(-0.47) 
 -0.001 
(0.11) 
  -0.017 
(-1.09) 
ON_conc    
0.001* 
(1.78) 
-
0.001*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.001** 
(-2.11)  
-
0.001*** 
(-4.40) 
-
0.002*** 
(-3.63) 
TS_conc    
-
0.002*** 
(-3.45) 
  
-
0.001*** 
(-3.42) 
 
0.001* 
(1.92) 
RAT_ON   
0.199*** 
(4.09) 
0.190*** 
(4.02) 
0.165*** 
(3.47)  
0.173*** 
(3.67) 
0.171*** 
(3.55) 
lnTA 
-
0.026*** 
(-6.45) 
-
0.028*** 
(-7.06) 
-
0.032*** 
(-7.55) 
-
0.033*** 
(-7.98) 
-
0.028*** 
(-6.87) 
-
0.029*** 
(-6.80) 
-
0.029*** 
(-6.80) 
-
0.030*** 
(-6.95) 
LEVER   
0.001*** 
(2.59) 
0.001*** 
(3.17) 
0.001* 
(1.79) 
0.001 
(1.29)  
0.001*** 
(2.95) 
LEVER_quad   
-
0.001*** 
(-2.90) 
-
0.001*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.001** 
(-2.37) 
-0.001** 
(-2.04)  
-
0.001*** 
(-3.24) 
Continues 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 Dual class premium [DCP] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Law 6404    
0.186*** 
(8.21)   
0.178*** 
(7.93) 
0.182*** 
(6.41) 
Law 9457      
-
0.068*** 
(-5.15) 
 
-0.032** 
(-2.30) 
Law 10303    
0.031** 
(2.41)   
0.047*** 
(3.54)  
Tag_pn      
-0.031 
(-1.41)    
Tag_onpn       
-
0.080*** 
(-4.41) 
  
Tag_Along        
-0.043** 
(-2.41) 
-0.042** 
(-2.36) 
FAM 
0.066** 
(2.53) 
0.056** 
(2.14) 
0.064** 
(2.45) 
0.061** 
(2.33) 
0.074*** 
(2.74) 
0.051** 
(1.93) 
0.068** 
(2.54) 
0.070*** 
(2.62) 
SOE 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.12) 
0.011 
(0.43) 
0.011 
(0.45) 
0.015 
(0.58) 
-0.010 
(-0.40) 
0.011 
(0.44) 
0.012 
(0.46) 
 
        
Dummies 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 
0.287*** 
(4.09) 
0.567*** 
(7.69) 
0.266*** 
(3.09) 
0.527*** 
(6.33) 
0.213*** 
(2.47) 
0.662*** 
(8.37) 
0.273*** 
(3.09) 
0.272*** 
(3.19) 
R2 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 
Prob. (F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms (n) 2,590 2,586 2,586 2,587 2,588 2,585 2,590 2,586 
Note. The Dual Class Premium [DCP] is the dependent variable. DCP is calculated as the difference of stock prices of ON 
shares to PN shares divided by the price of ON shares. A detailed description of DCP, along with operational definition of 
all explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. Binary variables related to the firms’ industry (IND) were included in the 
regressions below, being omitted from the tables for reasons of space. The sample is comprised of 2,590 firm-years 
observations for the 1995-2006 period. Figures in parentheses indicate the t statistics. ***, **, and * correspond to 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The coefficients were estimated through the Ordinary Least 
Squares method [OLS] with heterocedasticity-robust standard errors.  
 
 
The Relevance of Tag along Rights and Identity of Controlling Shareholders for the Price Spreads 
between Dual-Class Shares: the Brazilian Case 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 7, n. 1, art. 1, pp. 1-21, Jan./Mar. 2010     www.anpad.org.br/bar 
17 
Table 6 
 
Determinants of Dual Class Premium [DCP] in Brazil – Fixed-Effects Regressions 
 
 Dual class premium [DCP] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LIQ_vol 0.010*** 
(3.01) 
 
0.009*** 
(2.89) 
0.008*** 
(2.75) 
0.009*** 
(2.97) 
0.010*** 
(3.17) 
0.008*** 
(2.71) 
0.009*** 
(2.76) 
LIQ_neg 
 
0.004 
(1.27)       
DIV_DIF 0.085*** (3.16) 
  0.055** 
(2.07) 
 0.059** 
(2.22) 
0.057** 
(2.19) 
 
DUM_DIV  0.017 
(1.17) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
 0.016 
(1.09) 
  
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
ON_conc  
  
0.002*** 
(3.34) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.001** 
(-2.00) 
 
-0.002*** 
(-5.68) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
TS_conc  
  
-0.005*** 
(-8.18) 
  
-0.004*** 
(-7.88) 
 
-0.004*** 
(4.66) 
RAT_ON 
  
0.579*** 
(5.03) 
0.381*** 
(3.42) 
0.387*** 
(3.39) 
 
0.385*** 
(3.46) 
0.530*** 
(4.61) 
lnTA -0.014 
(-1.20) 
-0.013 
(-1.10) 
-0.014 
(-0.97) 
-0.017 
(-1.17) 
-0.017 
(-1.17) 
-0.016 
(-1.11) 
-0.007 
(-0.53) 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
LEVER 
  
0.001 
(0.84) 
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
 
0.001 
(0.27) 
LEVER_quad 
  
0.000 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
 
0.001 
(0.41) 
Law 6404 
   
0.187*** 
(10.42) 
  
0.188*** 
(10.42) 
0.078*** 
(3.38) 
Law 9457 
     
-0.083*** 
(-7.43) 
 
-0.065** 
(-4.99) 
Law 10303 
   
0.043*** 
(3.62)   
0.051*** 
(4.23)  
Tag_pn  
    
-0.041 
(-1.33)    
Tag_onpn  
     
-0.019 
(-0.57)   
Tag_Along  
      
-0.026 
(-1.04) 
-0.032 
(-1.27) 
Dummies 
Industry NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Intercept 
0.311* 
(1.79) 
0.258* 
(1.47) 
0.159 
(0.76) 
0.225 
(1.08) 
0.190 
(0.88) 
0.593*** 
(2.90) 
0.095 
(0.49) 
0.187 
(0.86) 
R2 within  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Prob. (F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. (n) 2,637 2,639 2,633 2,634 2,635 2,632 2,637 2,633 
Note. The Dual Class Premium [DCP] is the dependent variable. DCP is calculated as the difference of stock prices of ON 
shares to PN shares divided by the price of ON shares. A detailed description of DCP, along with operational definition of all 
explanatory variables, is presented in Table 2. The sample is comprised of 2,590 firm-years observations for the 1995-2006 
period. Figures in parentheses indicate the t statistics. ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. The coefficients were estimated through the Fixed-Effects procedure [FE].  
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Taking into account both OLS and FE regressions (particularly the results from FE procedure, 
considered more robust(21)), we observed the following results (all of them in line with the 
hypotheses): 1) The influence of the enactment of corporate laws on DCP: a positive association 
between Laws 6.404/1976 and 10.303/2001 dummies and DCP, and a negative association between 
Law 9.457/1997 dummy and DCP; 2) Family control positively associated with DCP; 3) A larger 
relative liquidity of voting shares positively associated with DCP; 4) A larger relative amount of 
dividends paid to voting shares positively associated with DCP; 5) The percentage of voting shares 
(control rights) held by controlling shareholders negatively associated with DCP; 6) The percentage of 
total shares (cash flow rights) held by controlling shareholders negatively associated with DCP; 7) The 
ratio of voting shares to total shares positively associated with DCP. 
For the remaining variables (firms’ size, financial leverage, and voluntary granting of tag along 
rights), we did not find a significant result after performing FE regressions. Therefore, we prefer not to 
be conclusive on these variables due to the potential econometric problems that could arise in OLS 
regressions. Results with the voluntary granting of tag along rights can be considered intriguing. We 
hypothesized a negative impact on DCP when firms voluntarily grant this mandatory bid rules for both 
share classes (simultaneously raising the tag along of voting shares from 80% to 100% and the tag 
along for non-voting shares from 0% to 80% or above), or when they grant these tag along rights only 
to non-voting shares, since in both cases a potential relative advantage of voting shares would be taken 
off. Although we found a negative sign for the coefficients of tag along rights’ variables in all 
specifications, we did not observe statistical significance in FE regressions. This result could have 
occurred for at least one of two reasons: i) as explained in the previous section describing the 
institutional framework in Brazil, firms can choose to provide non-voting shares one of three 
advantages determined by Law 10.303/2001. Since tag along rights is one of these advantages, some 
firms could have exchanged the extra benefit for non-voting shares (for instance, canceling their 
additional dividends when they grant tag along rights). Therefore, the net relative gain for non-voting 
shares would not be significant when firms voluntarily grant tag along rights, leading to a null impact 
on DCP; and/or, ii) the voluntarily granting of tag along rights started only after 2001, which could 
have led to insignificant coefficients due to few observations in our sample. 
Overall, our results strongly support the following hypotheses of our study: H1 and H2 – exogenous 
changes on Corporate Law do influence the relative value of one share class against the other one; H4 
– the presence of a family as a controlling shareholders tends to increase the DCP, probably due to 
larger private benefits of control taking place; H6 – a higher relative payment of dividends to non-
voting shares negatively influences DCP; H7 – a higher relative liquidity of voting shares tends to 
increase DCP; H8 – companies with a higher ratio of voting shares against all outstanding shares tend 
to increase the relative value of voting shares, thus enhancing DCP; H9 – a higher percentage of 
voting shares held by controlling shareholders tends to reduce DCP, probably due to a lower 
probability of takeover contests. 
On the other hand, our results do not offer conclusive support for the hypotheses that: H3 –the 
voluntary granting of tag along rights negatively influences DCP; H5 – state-owned control reduces 
DCP; H10 – there is a quadratic relationship between financial leverage and DCP; and, H11 – a firm’s 
size negatively influences the level of DCP. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This paper aimed to analyze the evolution and potential determinants of the so-called dual class 
premium in Brazil from 1995 to 2006 with a focus on two specific corporate governance aspects: the 
granting of tag along rights, and the identity of the controlling shareholders. We consider Brazil an 
interesting case since listed firms have: widespread issuance of non-voting shares; significant presence 
of family control; and, have been under significant legal and voluntary changes throughout this period 
which changed the level of tag along rights of one share class against the other one. 
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Two main results stand out. Firstly, we observed a significant influence of the enactment of two 
different corporate laws on DCP. Specifically, exogenous legal changes regarding tag along rights that 
increased (decreased) the relative advantage of voting shares increased (decreased) DCP in Brazil. 
Secondly, we find a positive relation between family control and DCP in all specifications. Our first 
main result is in line with results obtained by Silva and Subrahmanyam (2007) in Brazil, whereas our 
second is in line with results obtained by Caprio and Croci (2008) in Italy. However, unlike the 
previous paper recently conducted in Brazil, we did not find robust evidence that voluntary granting of 
tag along rights (an endogenous choice by firms willing to display higher corporate governance 
standards) influenced DCP level in our sample. The disparity of the results may be due to the different 
methodological approaches employed. Whereas Silva and Subrahmanyam (2007) investigated the 
impact of tag along rights on DCP by an event study analysis, we investigated the same phenomenon 
by panel data techniques.  
Besides the two main results, we found three other important results: i) unlike other papers in this 
line of research that have found relatively stable levels for DCP in their countries, we found a 
significant variation in DCP in Brazil during our sample period, ranging from a mean (median) of 
17.97% (4.95%) in 1996 to -2.87% (-6.93%) in 2000; ii) higher share liquidity and dividend yields for 
non-voting shares are negatively associated with DCP; and, iii) the concentration of both control rights 
and cash flow rights by controlling shareholders are negatively associated with DCP level.  
Overall, our paper contributes to this line of research in terms of: i) scope – the inclusion of the 
identity of controlling shareholders as an explanatory factor of DCP); ii) methodology – analysis of 
recent data collected for a long time span by panel data techniques; and, iii) results – positive influence 
of family control on DCP and different results regarding the voluntary granting of tag along rights. 
As policy implications, our results show that regulations regarding shareholders’ rights and the 
identity of controlling shareholders are two crucial corporate governance variables for the level of 
DCP in environments characterized by concentrated ownership structures and the prevalence of 
agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1
 Based on the well accepted premise that the value of a financial asset is given by the present value of its future cash flows 
discounted by its appropriate opportunity cost of capital. 
2
 The theoretical arguments for the relationship between different equity classes are shown in Grossmann, S., & Hart, O. 
(1988). One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 175-202, and Harris, 
M., & Raviv, A. (1988). Corporate governance, voting rights and majority rules. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(2), 203-
235. The models presented in both papers are derived from takeover stories, predicting a premium for stocks with superior 
voting rights. On the empirical side, several studies since the early 80s have analyzed the value of voting rights. As examples 
of such studies, Lease et al. (1983), Megginson, W. L. (1990). Restricted voting stock, acquisition premiums, and the market 
value of corporate control. The Financial Review, 25(2), 175-198, Zingales, L. (1994). The value of the voting rights: a study 
of the Milan stock exchange. Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), 1047-1073. Zingales, L. (1995). What determines the value 
of corporate votes? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4), 1047-1073 and Cox, S., & Roden, D. (2002). The source of 
value of voting rights and related dividend promises. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(4), 337-351, provide evidence for the 
US market; Smith, B., & Amoako-Adu, B. (1995). Relative prices of dual class shares. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 30(2), 223-239, for Canada; Levy, H. (1983). Economics evaluation of voting power of common stock. Journal of 
Finance, 38(1), 79-93, for Israel; Zingales (1994), Linciano (2003) and Caprio and Croci (2008), for Italy, Bergström, C., & 
Rydqvist, K. (1990). Ownership of equity in dual class firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 14(2-3), 255-269 and 
Rydqvist, K. (1996). Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 20(8), 1407-1425, for Sweden; Neumann, R. (2003). Price differentials between dual-class stocks: voting premium 
or liquidity discount. European Financial Management, 9(3), 315-332, for Denmark; and Ødegaard (2006) for Norway. 
Nenova (2003) presented the first cross-country analysis on this field of research. As an overall result (with the exception of 
Neumann (2003) and the partial exception of Ødegaard (2006), these papers have found that shares with superior voting 
rights really do trade at a premium. 
3
 Damodaran (2005, p. 50) states that “the shares that carry no or fewer voting rights should be worth less than shares that 
carry more voting power and the difference in price should be a function of the expected value of control. The premium on 
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voting shares should therefore be a function of the probability that there will be a change in management at that firm and the 
value of changing management”. 
4
 Listed companies in Brazil historically have a controlling shareholder or a controlling group (usually connected by a formal 
shareholder agreement) holding more than 50% of voting shares. Since 2005, we have seen the emergence of a couple of 
widely held firms with no controlling shareholders, such as Lojas Renner (retail) and Embraer (aeronautic). However, these 
firms constitute the exception, and none of them are in our sample. 
5
 For the U.S. market, Lease, R., McConnell, J., & Mikkelson, W. (1983). The market value of control in publicly traded 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1/4), 439-471, found a relatively small premium of 5-10% of voting over 
non-voting shares. Zingales (1995) confirmed their result, finding a premium of the same magnitude. 
6
 Israel (46%, Levy, 1982), Latin America (50-100%) and Italy (80%, Zingales, 1994). 
7
 Silva and Subrahmanyam (2007) report a negative median dual-class premium for eight of the eleven years analyzed by 
them (1994-2004). 
8
 The main rationale for this change was to facilitate the ongoing privatization program, allowing the Government to sell off 
its controlling stakes without sharing the control premium with minority shareholders. 
9
 For instance, the migration to Bovespa’s special listing segment Level 2 requires firms to grant tag along rights of 100% to 
minority voting shareholders and of 80% to non-voting shareholders. On October 4, 2007, 141 firms (about 32% of all firms 
listed at Bovespa) voluntarily granted tag along rights beyond the legal requirements.  
10
 According to Nenova (2001, p. 2), the country boasts the world’s widest average wedge between control and cash flow 
rights of listed companies and 89% of all listed companies have issued non-voting shares. 
11
 In a recent paper with around 200 listed firms, Silveira, A. Di M. da, Leal, R. P. C., Silva, A. L. C. da, & Barros, L. A. B. 
C. de (2007). Evolution and determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality in Brazil [Working Paper Series]. Social 
Science Research Network, New York, NY. Retrieved September 5, 2009, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=995764, found that 
in 2004, 51% of Brazilian firms were controlled by families, 24.4% were controlled by a group of different investors, 17.5% 
were controlled by foreigners, and 6.6% were controlled by the government.  
12
 The authors find that the presence of a family as the largest shareholder increases the voting premium. 
13
 This requirement could not be applied to cases where the corporate charters specified the size and features of the dividend 
rights of non-voting shares. 
14
 However, this rule only applies to new firms or for firms established before but decided to go public after October 2001. 
15
 The provisions of CVM Instruction 299/1999 reinstating minority shareholders rights were later incorporated into Law 
10.303/2001. 
16
 For share prices, we compute the closing share price of the last day of the respective quarter. We use the financial 
statement available on the respective quarter for accounting and ownership variables. Therefore, the accounting (firms’ size 
and leverage) and ownership variables (percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders) employed in a given quarter 
are referred to the immediately previous quarter. 
17
 Economatica® is a database system focused on Latin American firms. 
18
 We reran all analyses without winsorizing DCP. The results remain qualitatively the same. We thank an anonymous referee 
for this request. 
19
 We also ran Randon Effects tests. After the comparison with Fixed Effects results by applying Hausman test, we decided to 
report only Fixed Effect results. 
20
 Silveira et al. (2007) provide evidence of the improvement of overall corporate governance quality in Brazil from 2000 to 
2006. 
21
 Since the OLS method does not account for unobserved firm characteristics that could hinder the correct relationship 
identification between DCP and its potential determinants, we rely on the results from the FE method. 
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